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Abstract
This research empirically establishes the hypothesis that the process of
population aging in a society as a whole affects the attitudes of its members
towards immigration. Hence, an aging social environment exerts an effect
on the attitudes of individuals towards immigration after accounting for
their age and other individual characteristics. We test this hypothesis in
a multilevel analysis of individuals living in 25 European OECD countries
over the period 2002-2017. Our measure of “societal population aging” is the
old-age dependency ratio. “Attitudes” are taken from immigration related
questions in eight consecutive rounds of the European Social Survey. For
these attitudes we find non-linear, U-shaped relationships. Hence, the effect
of societal population aging on individual attitudes towards immigration is
negative in young societies and positive in old ones.
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1 Introduction
Attitudes towards immigration vary drastically within and across member states
of the European Union ranging from outright hospitality to violent resistance.1
At the same time, the salience of immigration issues among the electorate is high
and increasing (see, European Parliament (2017), p. 9). These tendencies challenge
existing democratic parties and stimulate the emergence of new political movements,
often at the expense of political stability. The response of European governments
to future immigration flows and the design of integration policies is therefore likely
to reflect these attitudes.
Hence, to predict and assess the political response to migration flows it is
essential to comprehensively understand the determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration. This paper argues that societal population aging, defined
as the process by which the older population becomes a proportionally larger
fraction of the total population, is a determinant of individual attitudes towards
immigration. To put it bluntly, we establish empirically that the attitudes towards
immigration of an individual living in a young population systematically differ
from the attitudes towards immigration of the same individual living in an old
population. As population aging is ongoing in all countries included our sample this
main finding helps predict the evolution of individual attitudes towards immigration
and the political responses to it.
We establish the relationship between societal population aging and individual
attitudes towards immigration in a multilevel analysis of individuals living in 25
European OECD countries over the period 2002-2017. Our measure of “societal
population aging” is the old-age dependency ratio, henceforth OADR. “Attitudes”
are taken from immigration related questions in eight consecutive rounds of the
European Social Survey (ESS).2 There is population aging if the OADR increases
over time. Figure 1 shows that the level of population aging measured by a country’s
OADR differs across countries of our sample. To a first approximation, there is
population aging over the considered time span in all of these countries since the
respective OADRs increase.
[Figure 1 about here]
A first, non-parametric exploration of the data suggests that the relationship
1For instance, Talo (2017) argues that Western European countries are on average much more
open to immigration than Central and Eastern European countries. Within Germany attitudes
to immigration are more positive in the western part of the country than in the east. See, e. g.,
The Economist (2015) on the European refugee crisis that started in 2015.
2We take ESS rounds 1 to 7 from European Social Survey Cumulative File, ESS 1-7 (2016)
and ESS round 8 from ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016).
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between individual attitudes towards immigration and societal population aging
is non-linear.3 Our formal test of this suggestion reveals non-linear, U-shaped
relationships. Hence, the effect of societal population aging on individual attitudes
towards immigration is negative if the population is sufficiently young, i. e., the
OADR is sufficiently small. However, beyond a critical level of the OADR, societal
population aging induces more pro-immigrant attitudes with individuals.
To rationalize this finding one may think of two channels that potentially
operate simultaneously and, taken together, may deliver an aggregate U-shaped
relationship.4 The first channel explains why an attitude becomes more anti-
immigrant as societal population aging increases. To develop an intuition for this
observe first that in our sample older individuals are associated with more negative
attitudes towards immigration. Hence, in an older society negative attitudes are
likely to be more prevalent in everyday life, in the media, and in the political arena
than in a younger one. Therefore, individuals living in an older society are more
frequently reminded of the negative consequences of immigration and, following
the logic of Tversky and Kahneman’s Availability Heuristic, their attitudes adjust
and become more anti-immigrant (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
The second channel describes why an attitude becomes more pro-immigrant as
societal population aging increases. To understand this imagine a young country
(with a low OADR) where competition in the job market is tough since the workforce
is large. Then, new immigrants may be perceived by the native workforce as a
serious threat to employment and a decent wage. As the population ages, e. g., due
to a sustained decline in fertility, the number of workers falls. Accordingly, the job
market may more easily accommodate immigrant workers as societal population
aging eases competition in the labor market. For this reason individuals may
develop more pro-immigrant attitudes.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first that systematically disen-
tangles the effect of societal population aging and individual aging on attitudes
towards immigration. Existing contributions that focus on the role of individual
aging patterns on attitudes towards immigration include Sides and Citrin (2007),
Ivlevs (2012), Calahorrano (2013) and Schotte and Winkler (2016).
Sides and Citrin (2007) argue that characteristics of the overall state of the
economy have little bearing on the formation of individual attitudes towards
3We would like to thank Jordi Paniagua for the suggestion to test first for the presence of
non-linearities and then for the quadratic form. For more on this, see Section 4.1 below.
4In formal terms, the logic behind the mechanics of the two channels may be stated as
follows. Let Ω > 0 denote the OADR. The first channel is represented by a function f (Ω) with
f ′ (Ω) < 0 and the second by a function g (Ω) with g′ (Ω) > 0. Then, the sum of these functions,
h (Ω) = f (Ω) + g (Ω) is non-linear and U-shaped if there is a finite Ω∗ such that h′(Ω∗) = 0 and
for all Ω > 0 we have h′′ (Ω) = f ′′ (Ω) + g′′ (Ω) > 0.
3
immigration. However, these authors restrict attention to the first round of the
ESS, which captures only the period 2002-2003, and do not include the properties
of the populations’ age distribution in their analysis.
Ivlevs (2012) studies the formation of attitudes towards immigration in Latvia
over the timespan 2004-2005 and concludes that a declining fertility rate in mu-
nicipalities is conducive to more pro-immigrant attitudes. However, a declining
fertility captures only one reason why populations age. In contrast, our study of a
broad sample of countries over a long timespan uses a direct measure of population
aging. Then, the aggregate effect of societal population aging and the formation of
attitudes emerges as non-linear and U-shaped.
The study of Calahorrano (2013) focuses on Germany using the 2008 release
of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Unlike our study with its focus on societal
population aging, her paper deals with individual attitudes and cohort aging effects.
The author finds a positive correlation between the age of an individual and its
attitudes towards immigration.
Finally, Schotte and Winkler (2016) investigate why the elderly, i. e., older
cohorts, tend to be more averse to immigration than their younger peers. Using the
first six rounds of the ESS for the timespan 2002-2013, the authors find that the
correlation between individual age and pro-immigration attitudes is either negative
or zero in most of the countries in the sample. Nevertheless, the study is mute
on the role of societal population aging for the formation of individual attitudes
towards immigration.
Our study extends and complements the above-mentioned literature in at least
in two ways. First, we establish that societal population aging, on top of other
age-related individual or cohort measures, is a significant determinant of attitudes
towards immigration. Second, we document that the relationship between societal
population aging and attitudes towards immigration emerges as non-linear and
U-shaped.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data (Section 2.1) and our empirical strategy (Section 2.2). Our main findings
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 starts with a test of the presence of a U-
shaped relationship between societal population aging and individual attitudes
towards immigration (Section 4.1). Then, it shows that our findings survive various
robustness tests (Section 4.2). Section 5 elaborates more on our empirical findings
and studies the effect of societal population aging on a range of immigration related
attitudes such as i) preferences for the ethnic background of immigrants (Section
5.1), ii) the expected socio-economic contributions of immigrants (Section 5.2), and
iii) cultural homogeneity, education and work skills of immigrants (Section 5.3).
Finally, we discuss whether the effect of societal population aging on individual
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attitudes towards immigration is driven by an age group in our sample (Section
5.4). Section 6 concludes. All tables and figures are relegated to Section 7, the
Appendix.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 The Data
To explore the effect of an aging population on attitudes towards immigration,
we employ data from eight rounds of the ESS covering the period from 2002 to
2017. We conduct a multilevel analysis combining country-level and individual-level
controls in a sample of 25 OECD countries including Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. For these
countries the full set of controls for our benchmark analysis is available.5
Aggregate Controls
Our main explanatory variable is the OADR. It measures societal population
aging at the country level. The data is taken from the World Development
Indicators, henceforth WDI. The OADR states the number of people above the
age of 65 -the old- per 100 people of the working population aged 15-64.6
The remaining controls include income per capita, birth rate, life expectancy,
population density, unemployment, and urban population growth. These variables
qualify as plausible determinants of attitudes towards immigration that capture
the stage of development, other demographic factors as well as socioeconomic
determinants. We also control for the stock of a country’s foreign population taken
from the OECD International Migrant Database (“OECD IMD”).7 This variable
does not exist for Israel, which we therefore exclude from our sample. The OECD
data provide the measure of a country’s foreign population both by birth and by
5Focusing the analysis on a sample of OECD countries ensures that all countries under
examination completed the demographic transition and, thus, population aging is not only a
plausible concern but also part of the policy makers agenda. A number of studies suggest that in
countries at the onset of the demographic transition population aging is not yet a concern since
the “boom generation” is still active (Bloom et al., 2008).
6In Section 4 we replace the OADR as defined above by an alternative definition of the
dependency ratio, namely, the number of people aged 65 and over per 100 members of the total
population. With this measure of societal population aging our main results still hold.
7The OECD IMD has data showing flows and stocks of the total immigrant population and
immigrant labor force together with data on the acquisition of nationality (OECD, 2018).
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nationality. Here, we use the stock of foreign population by nationality.8 We then
aggregate both the WDI and OECD IMD data over 2-year intervals to match the
intervals of the ESS.
Descriptions and some summary statistics on the variables that we use are
provided in Table 1. The mean OADR is 24.92 varying from 10.04 in Turkey in the
period 2004-2005 to 35.97 in Italy in the period 2016-2017. In addition, Figure 1
shows the evolution of the OADR over time for the 25 countries of our sample over
the period 2002 to 2017. Some interesting patterns emerge. With the exception of
Luxembourg, there is a strict increase in the OADR for all countries. The OADR in
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, and Sweden considerably
increased over the last 10 years and reached levels beyond 27-28. Countries like
Iceland, Ireland, Slovakia, and Turkey have a relatively lower OADR. Nevertheless
their OADRs also increased. Turkey has by far the lowest OADR of all countries in
the sample.9 In Luxembourg the OADR remains fairly stable over the considered
time span.
Table 1 also shows that the mean annual income for the sample is 39,550 in
constant 2010 US dollars. The average life expectancy at birth is 79 years. The
average value of live births is approximately equal to 11 per 1000 mid-year members
of the total population. The average unemployment rate is 8.12%. The mean annual
urban population growth rate is 0.71%. The population density is approximately
at 145 people per square km of land area. The average foreign population by
nationality is roughly 1.7 million people.
Individual Attitudes and Controls
We obtain individual attitudes towards immigration and a wide array of indi-
vidual controls from the ESS. The individual characteristics include age, education,
gender, marital status, living with children, source of income, religious denomi-
nation, and belonging to an ethnic minority in a country. Descriptions and some
summary statistics on these variables are provided in Table 2.
Our proxies for the attitudes of individuals towards immigration are their
responses to the following six questions of the ESS:
1. Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
8Boeri (2010) mentions the difficulty of defining immigrant status when studying the fiscal
position of migrants in Europe using the EU-SILC data. Indeed, when immigrants are identified
based on their country of birth, this author notices the likelihood of committing the error of
misclassifying true nationals as being immigrants when they are, for whatever reason, born abroad.
However, the author also acknowledges that one does not account for cross-country differences in
naturalization laws when immigrant status is defined based on nationality.
9To this end we conduct a robustness test excluding Turkey (see Section 4). This, however,
does not affect our main results.
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2. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
3. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
4. Immigration bad or good for country’s economy
5. Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
6. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live.
These questions are available in all eight rounds of the ESS covering the period
2002-2017 and across all 25 countries of our sample. Our benchmark analysis is
therefore based on individual reactions to the above-mentioned questions.
As can be seen from Table 3, of these six questions the first three have an
average score of 2.5 out of 4. The average score for the remaining three questions
is approximately 5 out of 10. Everywhere, higher indicated values reflect a more
positive attitude towards immigration.
In an attempt to provide a better understanding of these attitudes, we grouped
the above six questions using the method of factor analysis into two categories
I. Allowing what Kind of Immigrants to the Host Country
II. Perceptions about the Socio-Economic Contributions of Immigrants to the
Host Country.
Beyond the above-mentioned six questions, the ESS has additional ones of
interest that provide further information on the evolution of individual attitudes
towards immigration. However, these questions are only available for a limited
number of years and a restricted number of countries. Therefore, we use them only
in Section 5, the discussion section. These questions include
7. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries in Europe
8. Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less
9. Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs
10. Immigrants make country’s crime problems worse or better
11. Qualifications for immigration: Christian background
12. Qualifications for immigration: committed to way of life in country
13. Qualifications for immigration: good educational qualifications
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14. Qualifications for immigration: speak country’s official language
15. Qualifications for immigration: be white
16. Qualifications for immigration: work skills needed in country.10
The total number of individual observations in our sample of 25 European
OECD countries is approximately equal to 315,000.
2.2 Empirical Strategy
This section introduces our benchmark analysis, which is described by
Ijit = β0 + β1Ωit + β2Ω2it + β3Zjit + β4Xit + β5Ci + β6Tt + jit.
Here, Ijit is the attitude towards immigration of individual j in country i at
ESS round t. The OADR is denoted by Ωit, whereas Ω2it is its squared value. The
presence of the quadratic term allows for the identification of a non-linear effect
of societal population aging on individual attitudes towards immigration. We
use the contemporaneous values of the OADR in our benchmark analysis. This
suggests a contemporaneous effect of societal population aging on attitudes towards
immigration.11
Our benchmark analysis contains a vector of confounders, Xit, which includes
a large number of time-varying country-level controls that may have an effect
on attitudes towards immigration. The right-hand side also shows a vector Zjit,
which includes a number of time-varying individual-level controls that may also
affect the attitudes towards immigration. The vector of country fixed effects, Ci,
captures unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, at least for time-invariant
characteristics such as geography and climate. The vector of year fixed effects,
Tt, captures time-specific shocks, e. g., the presence of the baby-boom generation
across countries. We denote the country and time-specific error term by jit. The
standard errors are clustered at both, the year (ESS round) and the country level.
As mentioned above, we group the six questions about immigration in the ESS
into two main categories and then perform a factor analysis within each group of
questions. Hence, for k = I, II, our empirical specification of the factor analysis is
10As can be seen from Table 4, of these ten questions the first has an average score of 2.5 out
of 4. The average score for the following three questions is 4 out of 10. The last six questions
have an average score of 4.5 out of 10. Again, higher indicated values reflect everywhere a more
positive attitude towards immigration.
11As shown in Section 4, our results are robust to the use of lagged values of the OADR.
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fkjit = β0 + β1Ωit + β2Ω2it + β3Zjit + β4Xit + β5Ci + β6Tt + kjit.
Here, fkjit is the attitude towards immigration of individual j in country i at
ESS round t that belongs to category k.
3 Key Findings
This section develops the empirical findings for our benchmark analysis. They are
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 has the results for category k = I, Table 6 those
for category k = II. Column (1) of both tables has the regression specification
that only includes year and country fixed effects.
Column (2) of the tables introduces individual age and its squared term as
controls. This allows for the distinction between an individual age effect and the
effect of societal population aging. Clearly, the age of the individual respondent
has a negative effect on its attitudes towards immigration whereas the effect of
societal population aging remains U-shaped. Column (3) enriches the analysis with
more individual-level controls including education, gender, marital status, living
with children, source of income, religious denomination, and belonging to an ethnic
minority in a country.
The remaining columns gradually introduce our additional country-level and
time-varying controls available for our benchmark analysis. More precisely, in
column (4), we control for income per capita to capture the stage of development of
a country, in column (5), we introduce the stock of foreign population by nationality,
in column (6), birth rates and life expectancy are added. Column (7) includes
the unemployment rate.12 Finally, column (8) adds population density and urban
population growth rate as additional demographic controls. Since column (8)
includes the full set of controls, we shall refer to this specification as our benchmark
analysis.
The estimated values of β1 are strictly negative whereas the estimated values of
β2 are strictly positive. Hence, the effect of societal population aging on individual
attitudes towards immigration is U-shaped.
As illustrated in Figure 2, this implies a strictly positive critical OADR, Ωˆ =
−β1/(2β2). On the one hand, if Ωit < Ωˆ, then in country i attitudes towards
immigration become more negative when the OADR increases a bit further. On
the other hand, if Ωit > Ωˆ, then in country i attitudes towards immigration become
more positive when the OADR increases further.
12Interestingly, in Tables 5 and 6, higher unemployment rates are associated with more hostility
towards immigration.
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[Figure 2 about here]
The critical OADR for k = I is equal to 32 whereas for k = II, it is equal to
28.5. That implies for k=1 that in the period 2016-2017 countries such as Germany,
Finland, Italy, and Portugal with respective OADRs equal to 32,60, 33,55, 35,97,
and 32,82 find themselves on the increasing part of the U . In the same period,
the remaining countries are on the decreasing part. These numbers suggest that
the level of the critical OADR is not unrealistic. However, it is important to note
that the critical OADR is a number that is derived for all countries in the sample
conditional on the full set of controls. It is not specific to a particular country and
neither an unconditional result.
4 Robustness
4.1 Non-linear Specification
As already discussed in the introduction, we do not impose a quadratic specification.
Instead, we test for the presence of a U-shaped relationship between societal
population aging and individual attitudes towards immigration. In doing so, we
follow Lind and Mehlum (2010). These authors suggest that an appropriate test
determines whether on some interval of values of the explanatory variable, the
relationship in question is decreasing at low values within this interval and increasing
at high values. Our application of this test is shown in Table 7. Our results clearly
suggest a U-shaped relationship. Moreover, the value at which the minimum occurs
is very close to the critical OADR in our benchmark analysis, i. e., roughly 30.
In light of this finding, we use in our benchmark analysis the standard approach
including a quadratic term and a test of covariates.
4.2 Alternative Specifications
We also conduct several robustness tests to corroborate the validity of our results
under a number of different assumptions that require alternative specifications.
Table 8 summarizes our findings. Columns (1) and (2) correspond respectively to
k = I and k = II. Each numbered line of the table corresponds to a robustness
test performed on our benchmark analysis. For each of these tests, we report both
the effect of the OADR and its squared term. We also report the critical OADR
for each specification.
In Line 1 of Table 8, we conduct a regional analysis in a panel of 98 NUTS 1
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regions in 24 European OECD countries.13 This allows for the inclusion of a large
number of unobservables and helps to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity at the
regional level. Eurostat provides the regional annual data for the period 2002-2017.
As in our benchmark analysis, for k = I, 2, our empirical specification of the
factor analysis is
fkjrt = β0 + β1Ωrt + β2Ω2rt + β3Zjrt + β4Wrt + β5Tt + β6Rr + kjrt
Here, fkjrt is the attitude towards immigration of individual j in region r at
ESS round t that belongs to category k. The OADR is denoted Ωrt whereas Ω2rt
is its squared value. We use the contemporaneous values of the OADR in our
benchmark analysis. This suggests a contemporaneous effect of population aging
on attitudes towards immigrants. Our benchmark analysis contains a vector of
confounders, Wrt, which includes a large number of time-varying controls that may
have an effect on attitudes towards immigrants as well as a vector Zjrt including a
number of time-varying and individual-level controls. The vector of region fixed
effects, Rr, captures unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level, at least for
time-invariant characteristics such as geography and climate. The vector of year
fixed effects, Tt, captures time-specific shocks, e. g., the presence of the baby-boom
generation across countries. Finally, jrt is the region and time-specific error term.
The standard errors are clustered at both, the year (ESS round) and the country
level.
As observed from Table 8, our findings are similar to our benchmark analysis.
The effect of societal population aging on attitudes towards immigration at the
NUTS 1 level is also U-shaped. The critical OADR, for k = I is 26, for k = II, it
is 25.
In Line 2 we use a different definition of the OADR. More precisely, we now
consider the ratio of the population above 65 as a fraction of the total population.
All findings of our benchmark analysis remain intact, i. e., the relationship between
attitudes towards immigration and societal population aging remains U-shaped.
Naturally, as the OADRs under the new definition are lower so is the critical
OADR.
In Line 3 we replace the contemporaneous OADR by a lagged value to address
potential concerns about reverse causality. More precisely, for every round of the
ESS we use the OADR corresponding to the previous round. The estimates we find
are significant and similar in magnitude to our benchmark analysis. In particular,
the relationship between attitudes towards immigration and societal population
aging remains U-shaped.
13We have to exclude Luxembourg as for this country the relevant regional-level controls are
not available.
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In Line 4 we focus on the subsample of individuals with citizenship in their
country of residence. This is meant to check whether our results are driven by
the attitudes of immigrants without a citizenship, who may be more sympathetic
towards further immigration. However, the results of our benchmark analysis
survive this robustness test, too. If anything, the critical OADRs are slightly more
pronounced.
Finally, in Line 5 we remove Turkey from our sample to scrutinize whether
this country has the status of an outlier that significantly influences our results.
However, this is not the case.
5 Discussion and Extensions
In this section we exploit the above-stated questions 7 to 16 of the ESS to better
understand the mechanics that drive individual attitudes towards immigration
(Sections 5.1 to 5.3). These questions are only available for the ESS rounds 1 and 7
and were not asked in Iceland, Slovakia and Turkey. Finally, Section 5.4 addresses
the question of the potential role of cohort effects.
5.1 Do Aging Societies have a Preference for Immigrants
with a Particular Ethnic Background?
Table 9 suggests that the answer may be yes. Here, in Columns (1) to (4), we use
as the dependent variable the attitudes expressed in Questions 1, 2, 3, and 7 of the
ESS.
However, the critical OADR for Question 2 (Column(2)) is significantly smaller
than the one for Question 1 (Column (1)). In other words, individuals prefer
receiving additional immigrants with a different ethnic background from those who
are already present. This potentially reflects a fear for a dominating ethnic group
that may too strongly influence societal life.
The critical OADRs for Questions 3 and 4 are roughly the same. If anything,
the critical OADR for attitudes towards immigrants from poorer countries outside
Europe is lower than for European immigrants.
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5.2 Do Attitudes towards Immigration in Aging Societies
hinge on the Expected Socio-Economic Contribution
of Immigrants?
Table 10 suggests that the answer depends on the sort of socio-economic contribution.
Here, in Columns (1) to (6), we use as the dependent variable the attitudes expressed
in Questions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of the ESS.
The lowest critical OADR obtains in Column (4). This suggests that individuals
in aging societies understand that immigrants contribute positively to society, e. g.,
with the taxes they pay. The highest critical OADR appears in Column (3). Hence,
individuals in aging societies tend to find it harder to associate immigrants as
improving the quality of life in their country. Interestingly however, aging societies
do not perceive immigrants as worsening crime problems.
5.3 Education and Work Skills versus Cultural Homogene-
ity - What Matters more for Aging Societies?
Table 11 gives a clear answer. Here, in Columns (1) to (6), we use as the dependent
variable the attitudes expressed in Questions 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the ESS.
Attitudes towards immigration are more positive if immigrants have good
educational qualifications and the work skills needed in the host country (See
Columns (3) and (6)). However, cultural homogeneity does not seem to have a
significant effect on individual attitudes towards immigration. This is true for the
Christian background of immigrants, their commitment to the way of life in the
host country, their ability to speak the host country’s official language, and to be
white (Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)).
5.4 Is the Effect of Societal Population Aging on Individ-
ual Attitudes towards Immigration Driven by an Age
Group in the Sample?
To address this question, we focus on two age groups in the sample, the young
and the old. Then, we want to know whether societal population aging affects the
attitudes of these two age groups differently. If this was the case, then our results
may be driven by an age group effect. However, we find that the effect of societal
population on the attitudes towards immigration of both the young and the old is
very similar.
To derive this result, we first interact our explanatory variable, the OADR,
13
with a dichotomous variable for individuals aged 64 and below (the young) and
for individuals aged 65 and over (the old). In this specification the underlying
assumption is that only the effect of OADR on individual attitudes towards
immigration differs by age group. As can be seen from Panel I in Table 12, both
groups contribute equally to the effect of societal population aging on individual
attitudes towards immigration. The coefficients are similar in magnitude and have
the same sign. The critical OADRs are similar to those of our benchmark analysis.
Second, we split the sample according to individuals’ age into two subsamples,
on the one hand individuals aged 64 and below (the young), on the other hand
individuals aged 65 and over (the old). Here, our assumption is stronger since we
stipulate that the two age groups differ in all dimensions we control for, including
of course the effect of the OADR on attitudes. As can be seen from Panel II in
Table 12, both groups contribute equally to the effect of societal population aging
on individual attitudes towards immigration. Again, the coefficients are similar in
magnitude and have the same sign. Moreover, the critical OADRs are also similar
to those of our benchmark analysis.
Hence, we conclude from Panel I and II that our results are not driven by age
groups. Rather, they reflect the effect of overall societal population aging.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study establishes two main results. First, societal population aging is a
significant determinant of attitudes towards immigration. Second, the relationship
between societal population aging and attitudes towards immigration is U-shaped.
Accordingly, our study predicts that the effect of societal population aging on
individual attitudes towards immigration is negative in young societies and positive
in old ones.
7 Appendix: Tables and Figures
This appendix includes tables and figures to which we refer in the main text.
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Table 7: Results from the Test for a U-shaped Relation-
ship.
Specification: f(x)=x2
Extreme Point: 30.6527
Test:
H1: U shape
vs. H0: Monotone or
Inverse U shape
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Interval 10.04287 35.96815
Slope -0.1723394 0.0444478
t-value -3.925397 1.881223
P>|t| 0.0000433 0.0299713
Overall test of a presence
of a U shape:
t-value = 1.88
P>|t| = 0.03
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Table 8: Robustness Tests.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable:
fI fII
Line 1
OADR regional level -0.156*** -0.100***
(0.044) (0.034)
(OADR)2 regional level 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 26.00 25.00
Line 2
Old Above 65 Ratio -0.473*** -0.193***
(0.133) (0.081)
(Old Above 65 Ratio)2 0.012*** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.002)
Critical OADR 19.71 24.13
Line 3
OADR Lagged -0.253*** -0.112***
(0.066) (0.040)
(OADR)2 Lagged 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 31.63 28.00
Line 4
OADR surveyed individuals hold citizenship -0.269*** -0.122***
(0.068) (0.042)
(OADR)2 surveyed individuals hold citizenship 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 33.63 30.50
Line 5
OADR Turkey excluded from the sample -0.256*** -0.114***
(0.066) (0.039)
(OADR)2 Turkey excluded from the sample 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 32.00 28.50
Summary: This table displays the results of robustness tests that are conducted
on the U-shaped effect of societal population aging on individual attitudes towards
immigrants. Controls are the same as in our benchmark analysis. All regressions
feature time and country fixed effects.
Notes: (i) OADR is the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population
15-64 stated as the number of dependents per 100 persons of working age; (ii)
fI includes the attitudes 1, 2 and 3; (iii) fII includes the attitudes 4, 5 and
6; (iv) standard errors are clustered at country and year level; (v) robust and
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses; (vi) *** denotes statistical
significance at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05),
and * at the 10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 12: Is the Effect of Societal Population Aging on Individual
Attitudes towards Immigration Driven by an Age Group in the Sample?
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable:
fI fII
Panel I: Interacting OADR with Cohorts
OADR #young -0.255*** -0.114***
(0.067) (0.039)
(OADR)2 #young 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 31.88 28.50
OADR #old -0.257*** -0.115***
(0.066) (0.039)
(OADR)2 #old 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 32.13 28.75
Observations 266,706 257,399
Panel II: Splitting the Sample in Cohorts
OADR young -0.255*** -0.114***
(0.064) (0.039)
(OADR)2 young 0.004*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 31.88 28.50
Observations 208,697 203,144
OADR old -0.259*** -0.120***
(0.071) (0.037)
(OADR)2 old 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Critical OADR 32.33 30.00
Observations 58,009 54,255
Summary: This table discusses whether the U-shaped effect of societal population
aging on individual attitudes towards immigrants is driven by the young or the
old cohort in the sample. Controls are the same as in our benchmark analysis. All
regressions feature time and country fixed effects. Panel I interacts the OADR
with the young and the old cohorts. Panel II splits the sample in two parts, the
young and the old cohorts.
Notes: (i) OADR is the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population
15-64 stated as the number of dependents per 100 persons of working age; (ii) fI
includes the attitudes 1, 2 and 3; (iii) fII includes the attitudes 4, 5 and 6; (iv)
standard errors are clustered at country and year level; (v) robust and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses; (vi) *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1 percent level (p < 0.01), ** at the 5 percent level (p < 0.05), and * at the
10 percent level (p < 0.10), all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Figure 2: The Critical OADR. The relationship between an attitude towards
immigration and OADR is U-shaped. The critical OADR is given by Ωˆ = −β1/(2β2).
To the left of this value, societal population aging, i. e., a small increase in the
OADR, implies a more negative attitude towards immigration. To the right, the
opposite holds.
0
Attitude
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Ωˆ = −β1
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